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Abstract 
This paper argues for a modal view of probability. The syntax 'and semantics of one par­
ticularly strong probability logic are discussed and some examples of the use of the logic are 
provided. We show that it is both natural and useful to think of probability as a modal operator. 
Contrary to popular belief in AI, a probability ranging between 0 and 1 represents a continuum 
between impossibility and necessity, not between simple falsity and truth. The present work 
provides a clear semantics for quantification into the scope of the probability operator and for 
higher-order probabilities. Probability logic is a language for expressing both probabilistic and 
logical concepts. 
1 Introduction 
Probability is typically treated as a metatheoretic concept. In other words, one talks in a meta­
language about the probabilities of object-language sentences. For example, this is the way Nilsson's 
Probabilistic Logic is constructed [Nilsson, 1986]. There are numerous advantages, however, to 
treating probability as a modal operator in the object language. By this we mean that probability 
is treated as a type of logical operator so that statements about probabilities may be combined 
freely with other statements in the object language. We will call any such language a probability 
logic. The formal language we will use will be first-order logic with the addition of the modal 
operator P, subscripted by a real number to denote the probability of a sentence or a pair of 
numbers to indicate the interval within which the probability lies. 
Such a probability logic provides a language for explicitly reasoning about probability. It gives 
us the ability to write sentences with both logical and probabilistic components such as "Jane plays 
the saxophone and is probably Miss America." 
Plays-sax( Jane) 1\ P.8(Miss-America( Jane)) 
It allows us to formulate higher-order probability statements, e.g. "There is a 50% chance that the 
coin is biased 2/3 in favor of heads." , 
P.sP.s7( Heads) 
It enables us to write sentences that combine the above two characteristics, such as: "The proba­
bility that it is cloudy and that the chance of rain is 30% is .2." 
P.z (Cloudy 1\ P.3(Rain)) 
1The authors would like to thank Steve Hanks, David Selig, Peter Cheeseman, and Carl Kadie for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We would particularly like to thank Patrick Maher for taking the time to 
set us straight on a number of critical issues. 
2This work was supported by the author's Cognitive Science/ AI fellowship. 
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It gives us an unambiguous way of expressing the relationships among the scopes of quantifiers and 
probability operators as in: "There is an employee who is probably a thief." 
3zEmployee(z) 1\ P.7(Thief(z)) 
As a last illustration, consider the following example inspired by a cartoon in the magazine Discover 
(June, 1985). A general explains two alternative SDI systems to the President by saying: 
Plan A stops each Soviet missile with an 80% chance. 
Plan B has an 80% chance of stopping all Soviet missiles. 
These two statements make very different assertions about the plans they are describing. In 
particular, if the President is a rational man he will choose plan B over plan A. We would like a 
logic which can represent the meanlng of both these statements, can make clear how they differ, 
and can show why plan B is preferable to plan A. 
Probability is represented by a continuum of values between 0 and 1. It is a popular belief in AI 
that probability is closely related to :first-order logic partially because probability values represent 
a continuum between truth and falsity. 
In this paper we present a semantical generalization of ordinary first-order logic in which 
the truth values of sentences can range between 0 and 1. - Nils Nilsson [1986] 
Formally, probability can be regarded as a generalization of predicate calculus, where 
instead of the truth value of a formula given the evidence (contezt) having only the 
values 0 {false) or 1 (truth), it is generalized to a real number between 0 and 1. - Peter 
Cheeseman [1985] 
This view, however, is not quite correct. To shed light on what kind of continuum probability 
values represent, consider the three pairs of sentences: 
1) The coin will either land heads or tails on the next toss. 
2) The coin will land heads or the coin will land tails on the next toss. 
3) The coin will necessarily land either heads or tails on the next toss. 
4) The coin will necessarily land heads or the coin will necessarily land tails on the next toss. 
5) The probability that the coin will land either heads or tails on the next toss is one. 
6) The probability of landing heads on the next toss is one or the probability of landing tails on 
the next toss is one. 
Clearly the first statement is true if and only if the second is true. The second pair of statements, 
however, are not equivalent. The third statement is certainly true but the fourth would imply 
that the coin is either two-headed or two-tailed. The question is: is the third pair of statements 
more closely related to the first or to the second pair? If it corresponds to the first pair then the 
fifth statement would have to imply the sixth statement. This is clearly not the case. It is, in 
fact, not the case for exactly the same reason that the third statement does not imply the fourth. 
Thus it is clear just from intuition that probability represents a continuum between necessity and 
impossibility not between simple truth and falsity. Alethic logic, the modal logic of necessity and 
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possibility, captures exactly this distinction. It seems reasonable to expect a model theory for 
probability logic to be related in some way to a model theory for alethic logic. 
We are not the first to suggest a modal view of probability. Nicholas Rescher [Rescher, 1962] 
was perhaps the first to examine the relationship between probability and modality. He formulated 
a logic in which a probability of one was interpreted as necessity and showed that in a finite 
possibility space, modal logic S5 is "appropriately regarded, nothing more than a propositional 
probability logic." Since then several philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians have discussed 
this interesting relationship [Danielsson, 1967; Gardenfors, 1975; Halpern and McAllester, 1984; 
Gaifman, 1986; Ruspini, 1987]. The work most closely related to that presented in this paper 
is Fagin and Halpern's w:.ork on probability and belief [1988a; 1988b; 1988]. The present work 
contributes to the topic by presenting a more thorough discussion of the relat ionship between 
modal logic and probability and a model theory that can handle both quantification and higher­
order probability. 
. 
The standard way to formalize the semantics of modal logics is in terms of Kripke structures 
[Kripke, 1963]. A Kripke structure is a model composed of a set of possible worlds and a binary 
accessibility relation between the worlds. A possible world can be considered to be a complete 
description of one possible reality or state of affairs. In an alethic logic, one world is accessible 
from a given world if it is considered possible with respect to that given world. Various alethic 
logics satisfying different properties may then be defined in terms of restrictions on the accessibility 
relations of the models. To define a semantics for probability logic we may construct our models, 
analogously to Kripke structures, in terms of probability distributions over possible worlds. 
2 Coherence Constraints 
There are a number of different properties we may wish a probability logic to satisfy. If we wish the 
logic to describe coherent beliefs, the logic should certainly satisfy the axioms of probability. This 
requirement is met by requiring the weights on the possible worlds to be probability distributions. 
Coherence may further require higher- and lower-order probabilities to satisfy certain mutual con­
straints. Two possible constraints suggested by Brian Skyrms [Skyrms, 1980, Appendix 2] are a 
minimal self-knowledge constraint (Cl) and Miller's principle (MP), as listed below. Additionally, 
several researchers [H.E. Kyburg, 1987; Good, 1965] have suggested an expected value constraint 
(EV) . Each subsequent constraint below entails the previous ones. 
Cl: P R(pr(A) E J) = 1 --+ P R(A) E J, where P R is the higher-order probability and pr is the 
lower-order probability. 
EV: The second-order probability should equal the expectation of the second-order probability 
applied to the first-order probability. 
MP: PR(Aipr(A) E I) E I 
Which constraints are applicable is a function of the interpretation we place on the probabilities. 
If we interpret higher and lower order probabilities as the rational degree of belief of an agent that 
does not know his own mind then C1 is a reasonable constraint. An agent that violates C1, is certain 
that his degree of belief in A is I although it isn't. Constraint MP, Miller's principle , is justified 
only if an agent's belief changes are the result of learning experiences.3 A number of researchers 
3Kyburg [1987] has recently dismissed the utility of higher-order probabilities by arguing that "higher-order 
probabilities can always be replaced by the marginal distributions of joint probability distributions." The argument 
claims that because EV is an unavoidable. constraint, higher- and lower-order probabilities can be combined into a joint 
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have used diachronic Dutch book arguments in an attempt show MP to be a general requirement 
for dynamic rationality [ van F'raassen, 1984; Goldstein, 1983]. These arguments essentially attempt 
to show that if you accept a certain system of bets concerning your present and future beliefs and 
you do not adhere to MP, you are open to a Dutch book. Levi, however, has recently shown these 
arguments to be invalid [ Levi, 1986]. 
If P R represents rational degree of belief and pr represents objective probability then MP 
is a plausible rule for assimilating knowledge about objective probability. If pr represents the 
probabilities of choosing a white ball from several different urns and PR represents the probability 
of choosing each of the different urns (both objective probabilities) then MP is again plausible. 
We would �e to formulate a logic which satisfies the strongest of the constraints discussed 
above, i.e. Miller's principle. This constraint will be expressed in the form of restrictions on the 
models. Weaker logics will simply be obtainable by relaxing the restrictions. The problem we 
address then is how to construct the Kripke structures in such a way that all of the examples 
presented earlier can be modeled and such that the logic conforms to Miller's principle. We present 
a solution that satisfies these requirements in the form of a logic based on Gaifman's [1986] theory 
of higher-order probability and Nilsson's [1986] Probabilistic Logic. For purposes of explication we 
will only discuss the theory restricted to probabilities nested to depth two; however, the general 
theory is capable of dealing with probabilities nested to any depth. Using this model theory, we 
will discuss the relation between probability logic and alethic logic. 
3 Syntax of Lmp 
We now give the syntactic rules for the language Lmp· As mentioned in the introduction, the 
language is that of first-order logic with the addition of the modal operator P.4 Some examples of 
syntactically correct sentences are 
P.sA 
P.a(P.2A A P.3B) 
Since we are only discussing sentences with probabilities nested to depth two, we can further 
simplify the presentation by explicitly indicating the nesting level. We will use P2 for the outer 
level probability operator and P1 for the inner probability operator. So P1 will always appear 
nested within a P2 operator. P1 refers to the first-order probability while P2 refers to the second­
order probability. The above examples are then written as follows: 
P2.sA 
P2.a(P1.2A A P1.3B) 
4 Semantics of Lmp 
The model theory presented here is based on Gaifman's [1986] theory of higher-order probability. 
We have retained as much of the terminology as possible but have modified parts in order to 
conform to standard logical semantics. We hope that the present formulation is somewhat more 
accessible to researchers in both uncertainty and logic. 
probability space. The problem with this argument is that there are cases in which EV need not hold and furthermore 
representing the higher- and lower-order probabilities in the manner Kyburg suggests requires the stronger Miller's 
principle, not just EV. 
4When talking about the knowledge of multiple agents, the P operator is superscripted by the name of an agent. 
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Our probability models have all the components of a Kripke structure except that the accessibil­
ity relation is replaced with probability distributions. Instead of having an accessibility relation for 
each modal operator, we have a distribution for each of the two operators, Pl and P2. Alethic logic 
gives us a set of worlds that are accessible from a given world; probability logic adds a probability 
distribution over that set of worlds. So in addition to saying that a world is possible, we say how 
possible. 
A model is a five tuple M = (W, P R2, P Rl, D, F), where W is an arbitrary set of objects we 
will call the possible worlds, P R2 and P Rl are functions from the set of worlds W to the set 
of probability distribution over W ,  D is the domain of all individuals, and F is the denotation 
fWlction that takes a non-logical symbol and a world into the the denotation of that symbol in 
that world. P Rl and P R2 are the fust- and second-order probability distributions, respectively. 
The first-order probability distribution associated with a world w is denoted by P Rl w. Note that 
Nilsson's [1986] Probabilistic Logic models correspond to the special case in which there is only one 
distribution level and the probability distributions of all the worlds are identical. Furthermore, a 
world in Nilsson's models corresponds to an equivalence class of worlds in our models. 
In the following discussion, we will have need to refer to the semantic value of a sentence before 
we have given the actual formal definitions for semantic value. The semantic value of a sentence a 
relative to a model M, a world w in M, and an assigrunent g of values to variables, will be denoted 
by [a]M,w,g. 
We now present the rules for determining the probability value of a sentence in a probabilistic 
model. The first-order probability value of a sentence a relative to a model, a world, and a value 
assignment is just the measure, with respect to the first-order probability distribution, of the set 
of worlds in which the sentence is true: 
ProblM,w,g(a) = PRlw{w : [a]M,w,g = T} 
As mentioned earlier, we would like our probability logic to satisfy Miller's principle. This will 
be done by first enforcing the expected value property and then adding a constraint to yield Miller's 
principle. 5 The expected value property could be achieved by placing a direct constraint on the 
second-order probability distribution: 
PR2(a) = fw PR2(w) · PRl(a) dw 
and defining the second-order probability value in the same way as Probl above. This is the way 
Gaifman (1986] constrains his models. 
Alternatively, we have chosen to incorporate the expected value constraint into the rule for 
evaluating the second-order probability value. This gives us much more freedom in choosing the 
probability distributions for the models. The second-order probability value of a sentence will be 
defined as the expected value of the first-order probability value: 
Prob2M,w,g(a) = fw PRlw' {w : [a]M,w,g = T} · PR2w(w')dw1 
There is one problem with the definitions of probability value given above: The set of worlds 
which satisfy a sentence may not be measurable. There are a number of possible solutions to 
this problem. If the number of possible worlds is either finite or countable then the set is always 
measurable and 
{ w;:(a]M,w; •9:::::T} 
�This then makes it clear how we could formulate a weaker probability logic. 
1 13 
dist w1 W2 W3 W4 
level 2H'd,H F,H F,T 2T'd,T 
2 .2 .1 .2 .5 .2 .3 0 .5 .2 .2 .1 .5 .2 0 .3 .5 
1 1 0 0 0 0 ·.5 .50 0 .5 .50 0 0 0 1 
Figure 1: Model for the coins example. 
Nilsson [ 1986] solves the measurability problem by restricting his logic to finite sets of sentences with 
no logical operators or quantifiers outside the scope of the probability operator. In this way he needs 
only to define a measure over the finite number of equivalence classes determined by the maximum 
2n consistent truth assignments to the n sentences. The probability of � sentence is then just the 
sum of the probabilities of the equivalence classes in which the sentence is true. Finally, Fagin and 
Halpern [ 1988b) discuss a number of possible solutions. For their propositional probability logic, 
they show that if every atomic formula is measurable then every formula is measurable. If a set is 
not measurable, they take the inner and outer measures of the set as roughly defining lower and 
upper bounds on the probability. They show that in the case of a finite probability space, the inner 
measure corresponds to a Dempster- Shafer belief function. 
We need one additional constraint to enforce Miller's principle. Miller's principle is defined in 
terms of conditional probability. We will define the conditional probability value of a sentence a 
given f3 in the usual way: 
When Prob2M,w,g(f3) = 0 the conditional probability value is undefined. The definition for 
Probl is similar. 
Then Miller's principle says that 
The bottom term is just the expected value of the set of worlds in which the first-order probability 
value of a is in the interval I. Then for Miller's principle to hold, the numerator must be this value 
multiplied by some number in the interval I. This is achieved by the following equivalence class 
constraint. 
Let C be the set of all worlds with a given P R1 distribution. Then for almost all 
wi E c6 PR1111i(C) = 1. 
The following simple example should help to clarify the meaning of the rather complex ter­
minology just presented. Suppose you are given a bag of coins and are told that it contains 2 
double-headed coins, 3 fair coins, and 5 double-tailed coins. We would like to know what the 
probability is that a coin drawn at random from the bag will land heads. There are many models 
consistent with this description. One possible probability model is shown in Figure 1. The figure 
shows the two distributions for each of four worlds. World w1 represents the event that a two­
headed coin is drawn and lands heads, world w2 that a fair coin is drawn and lands heads, etc. 
Notice that worlds w1 and w2 have the same P R1 distribution so, consistent with the equivalence 
6i.e, for all Wt and w2 for which there exists an S C Wand a w such that Prob2M,w,g(S) = 1 and Wt, w2 E,S 
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class constraint, in each of them P Rl{ w1, w2} = 1. We calculate the second-order probability value 
of heads in world w1 as the expected value of the worlds in which the coin lands heads: 
Prob2111 (H) = .2(1) + .1(.5) + .2(.5) + .5(0) = .35 
Since the probabilities in this example are objective probabilities, we would like Miller's principle 
to hold. We can see that this is the case: 
Prob2M,w1'9(H !\ Pl.sH) = .15 
Prob2M,w1'9(P1.sH) = .3 
Thus from the definition of conditional probability value it follows that 
Using the above definitions, we can now define the semantic values of sentences of the language. 
As in alethic logics, the denotation of an expression is determined relative to a model, a world, and 
a value assignment of individuals from the domain to variables. 
Let M = (W, P R2, P R1, D, F) be a model, w a world, and g a value assignment. Then [a ]M,w,g 
is defined in the usual way for modal logic, with addition of the two rules: 
• If a is P2r(¢>) then [a]M,w,g = T if Prob2M,w,g(¢>) E J. 
Otherwise [a]M,w,g = F. 
• If a is Plr( ¢>) then [a]M,w,g = T if Prob1 M,w,g( ¢>) E J. 
Otherwise [a]M,w,g = F. 
A sentence is satisfied by a model and a world iff its semantic value in that'model and world is 
T. A sentence is valid iff it is satisfied by every model and world. 
To illustrate the use of the semantic definitions, we will now analyze the descriptions of the two 
SDI plans presented in the introduction. The two descriptions can be formally written as follows: 
Plan A: \f:z:[Mi.ssile(:z:) --t P2.aStopped(:z:)] 
Plan B: P2.8(V:z:(Mi.ssile(:z:) --t Stopped(:z:)]) 
We assume that Missile is a rigid designator, i.e. that the set of missiles is the same in each 
possible world. This is reasonable since we are not worried about not knowing whether or not an 
object is a missile. Now, why should the President prefer plan B? We will show that the worst 
case scenario for plan B is the best case for plan A so plan B is at least as good as plan A. By the 
semantic definitions, sentences A and B are true iff 
(A) for all dE D[[Missile(x)]M,w,g(d/o:] = For [P2.8Stopped(x)]M,w,g[dfo:] = T] 
(B) fw[PRl"'{w : for each dE D[[Missile(:z:)]M,w,g(d/o:] = For 
[Stopped(:z:)]M,w,g(d/o:] = T]} · PR2111(w)] = .8 dw 
Since the set of missiles is the same in each world, we can eliminate Missile( x ) from the two 
semantic formulas and consider only models in which the domain contains only missiles. We can 
then expand these two formulas out to obtain: 
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(A) for all dE D(fw[PRru{w: [Stopped(:c)]M,w,g[d/:z:] = T} · PR2w(w)J = .8 dw] 
(B) fw[PRru{w: for each dE D[[Stopped(:c)]M,w,g[d/:z:] = T]} · PR2w(w)] = .8 dw 
So B holds in those models in which the probability of the worlds in which all missiles are 
stopped is .8. The remainder of the worlds assigned non-zero probability do not stop all of the 
missiles but may stop some of the missiles. So any given missile is stopped with probability at least 
.8. For plan A, each missile is stopped with probability exactly .8. Hence plan B is at least as good 
as plan A. 
5 Relation To Modal Logic 
We now formally examine the-relationship between probability logic and modal logic. Note that we 
will use 0 to denote necessity and 0 to denote possibility. It was pointed out in the introduction 
that probabilistic certainty is closely related to necessity. It is, however, not identical with necessity. 
The reason is that in an uncountable probability space we can have possible events of measure zero. 7 
For example, suppose I am going to pick a real number at random in the interval [0 1]. For each 
number, the probability that it will be picked is zero, yet it is possible that it will be picked. In 
other words, the first statement below is satisfiable, whereas the second statement is not. 
'ilzP2opicked( z) 1\ P2t3�picked( :c) 
'i/:c 0 -,picked( :c) 1\ 0 3zpicked( :c) 
Necessity is a stronger notion than probability one. For a sentence to be necessary it must be 
true in all possible worlds. This is not the case for probability one. The remainder of this section 
concerns only finite probability spaces. 
In finite models we can identify necessity with probability one. We create the probabilistic 
translation of an alethic sentence by replacing all necessity operator� by probability one. Since any 
alethic sentence containing possiblity operators can be represented using only necessity operators, 
this is sufficient to handle all alethic sentences. The question then is to what alethic logic does 
our probability logic correspond. As we have seen, the various restrictions on probability values 
(the axioms of probability, Miller's principle) impose restrictions on the structure of probability 
models. So a given probability logic will not correspond to just any alethic logic. In particular, 
our probability models correspond to Kripke structures with accessibility relations which are both 
transitive and serial. The weakest alethic logic in which accessibility must be both transitive and 
serial is D4. For the general theory we have the following result: 
Any alethic sentence is satisfiable by a finite Kripke structure of logic D4 iff its proba­
bilistic translation is satisfiable by a finite probabilistic model. 
Thus, in the finite case, our probability logic is a generalization of modal logic D4. We will call 
this logic PD4 for probabilistic D4. 
To illustrate the correspondence between D4 and PD4, we construct a mapping from proba­
bilistic models to Kripke structures. Let M = (W, P R2, P Rl, D, F) be a probabilistic model. This 
model can be mapped onto the Kripke structure M' = (W', R, D, F) as follows. For each world w 
7Shimony (1955] has argued that it is irrational to assign probability zero to possible events. This has the intuitive 
appeal that an agent would always prefer to bet on a possible event over an impossible one. If we accept Shimony's 
argument then we can equate p�;obability one with necessity. One possible way of modeling this is through the use 
of non-standard probabilities, based on non-standard analysis (Skyrms, 1980, Appendix 4]. 
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w3,2 
(i) 
w4,2 
(i) 
w1,2 
Gi) 
w2,2 
(i) 
w1,1 w2,1 w3,1 w4,1 
Figure 2: Kripke structure for coins example. 
in M, we generate two possible worlds (w, 1) and (w, 2) in the Kripke structure, corresponding to 
P R1 and P R2 in the probabilistic model. Next we construct the accessibility relation R according 
to the rule: 
If Prob2w"( { wy}) > 0 then R( (w:z:, 2), (wy, 1)) and 
if Prob1w"({wy}) > 0 then R((w:z:, 1), (wy, 1)). 
The domain D and denotation function F of M remain unchanged. 
Figure 2 shows the Kripke structure for the probabilistic model of the coins example in Figure 1. 
Every world at level 2 is connected to every world at levell. In world {w111), OH is true and in 
world (w4, 1) oTis true. Thus in world (w112), we have OoH, as well as 0 oT. This Kripke 
structure is a qualitative representation of the probabilistic model. Rather than representing degree 
of possibility now we can only represent possibility or impossibility. 
6 Summary and Future Research 
We have shown that, contrary to popular belief in AI, probability is related most closely to alethic 
logic, not first-order logic. A probability ranging between 0 and 1 represents a continuum between 
impossibility and necessity, not between simple falsity and truth. 
We have discussed a number of possible constraints on higher-order probabilities. We presented 
a simplified version of a general probability logic which satisfies Miller's principle, the strongest 
of these constraints. This logic provides a clear semantics for higher-order probability and for 
quantification within and into the scope of the probability operator. Probability logic PD4 was 
shown to be a generalization of modal logic D4. 
There are, of course modal logics both stronger than and weaker than D4. An interesting 
question is whether we can define probabilistic analogues of these other modal logics and whether 
these probability logics would have properties similar to their modal counterparts. In particular, 
knowledge logics such as 54 and 55 are characterized by the property that knowledge of a proposition 
implies the proposition is true. Probability is traditionally interpreted as representing belief. Could 
we define probability logics to represent knowledge? 
A complete set of inference rules still needs to be developed for the logic. The relation of 
probability logic to alethic logic suggests the use of inference procedures similar to those used for 
modal logic. The clear correspondence of probability models to Kripke structures should help us 
understand how modal theorem proving methods might be applied or modified. 
The theory thus far has only been developed for unconditional probabilities. In order to rep­
resent evidence and update beliefs, conditional p�obabilities are required. Conditional probability 
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would be treated as a binary modal operator. There are difficulties in dealing with conditionals 
in a logical framework due the the fact that a conditional probability statement is undefined for 
conditioning statements with probability zero. One possible way of handling this is to make condi­
tional probabilities primitive and define unconditional probabilities in terms of conditionals. This 
can be done using Popper functions [van Fraassen, 1976) . 
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